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Abstract
This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts be-
tween profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante iden-
tical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them
heterogeneous ex-post. In any given period, after having observed her in-
come, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary
cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme sce-
nario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with
any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. We demon-
strate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain,
depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries.
Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front
payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show
that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings econ-
omy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar
to Bulow and Rogoff (1989). From this equivalence and our characteri-
zation of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of
switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even
though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-
maximizing financial intermediaries (which we also shall call principals) and
agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty. In any given period, the
agent can walk away from the contract and sign with a competing principal,
while the principal itself cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment.
The paper is motivated by a common feature of a number of long-term
relationships between principals and agents such as those between firms and
workers, between international lenders and borrowing countries, between car or
health insurers and their clients, or between countries and their citizens. They
all have in common that the agents have the option to quit the relationship
and engage in a relationship with a competing party, whereas the principal is
committed (legally or by some other means) to honor the relationship.1 We
analyze the relationships listed above from the perspective of providing insur-
ance against unfavorable agent-specific income shocks. In this paper, we take
the most extreme perspective and study whether and to what degree relation-
ship capital alone, rather than direct costs of quitting, can support risk-sharing
arrangements, when the income process is perfectly observable, when there is
perfect competition between the intermediaries.
Without the ability of agents to move between competing principals, the ex-
isting “endogenous” incomplete markets literature (e.g. see Thomas andWorrall
(1988), Atkeson (1991), Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001), Kocherlakota (1996),
Krueger (1999), Krueger and Perri (1999), Alvarez and Jermann (2000, 2001)
or Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000)) has demonstrated that goodwill can be
built up and that substantial risk sharing may be achieved. In this literature it
is commonly assumed that the outside option to the risk sharing contract of the
agent is financial autarky, and the threat of being expelled into autarky sustains
the risk sharing arrangement.
The main purpose of this paper is to endogenize the outside option of agents
as being determined by the best possible deal that can be obtained from a com-
peting principal. We investigate to what extent the degree of insurance and the
dynamics of consumption in the equilibrium contract is affected by endogeniz-
ing this outside option. In the endogenous incomplete markets literature cited
above it is the threat of exclusion from future consumption insurance that may
enforce some risk sharing in equilibrium. Here we assume that no such threat is
credible, and the worst thing an agent can expect from defaulting an offer from
a competing principal of an insurance contract. Since there is no “glue” in the
relationship between principal and agent, one may conjecture that the resulting
1One area of applications in which the assumption of one- or two sided limited commitment
is particularly natural are dynamic employer-worker relationships. Consequently there exists
a rich literature that characterizes (optimal) wage contracts between employers and workers.
Important examples include Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Thomas and Worrall (1988)
and Beaudry and DiNardo (1991); a comprehensive review of this literature in provided by
Malcomson (1999). Our work is related to this literature since our optimal risk-sharing con-
tracts derived below will share some qualitative features with wage contracts studied in this
literature, in particular Harris and Holmstrom (1982).
2
allocation ought to be autarkic in that no risk sharing is possible.
The main results of this paper show that this conjecture is, in general, false.
Depending on the relative size of the time discount factor of the agent and the
time discount factor of the principal (the inverse of which can be interpreted as
the gross real interest rate) in equilibrium no, partial or full insurance of the
agent is obtained. If principals and agents discount the future at the same rate,
the equilibrium dynamic risk sharing contract necessarily entails full consump-
tion insurance for the agent in the long run. If the intermediary is somewhat
more patient than the agent (that is, for lower interest rates), partial insurance
will result. Only if the intermediary is very patient and thus interest rates are
extremely low, the intuitive autarky result obtains.2
If some or complete insurance is possible, the equilibrium contract unfolds
as follows. The agent with the strongest incentive to leave her current contract
with her principal is the agent with high income. A comparatively impatient
principal does mind to extract some resources from this agent now against the
promise of consumption insurance later on. As the agent ages on the contract,
she turns into a liability for the principal: he has received an initial up-front
payment, and is now liable to let the agent consume more than the net present
value of her future income. At his stage of the contract our assumption of
one-sided commitment by the principal is absolutely crucial.3 The agent, on
the other hand, will not want to walk away (even though she could), since she
would be worse off at the beginning of any new contract, in which she again
is asked to deliver an up-front payment. That is, any the necessarily involves
pre-payment today for insurance in the future. Since this pre-payment is sunk
after the contact has been “signed”, it provides the necessary glue between
intermediaries and agents that enables some insurance to occur.
A secondary contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that our economy
with competitive contracts is equivalent to a consumption-savings problem with
one-period Arrow securities and state-dependent short-sale constraints, as in
Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Without any costs of moving between principals,
the associated short-sale constraints in the consumption-savings economy rule
out borrowing altogether. This result mirrors Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989) no-
lending result in the context of a model of sovereign debt.4
Our paper extends the recent literature on endogenous incomplete markets
literature with many ex-post heterogeneous agents, as developed in Kehoe and
Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Two
papers that also discuss how to endogenize the outside option in this general
2Ray (2002) also contains an informal discussion of long-term relationships between a
principal and agent with different discount factors and exogenous outside options.
3Even though we do not model the source of the commitment ability of the principal
explicitly in this paper, in most of the applications cited above this commitment is derived
from the law that prevents, e.g., health insurers to terminate insurance contracts as long as
insurees have not violated the terms of the contract.
4The pre-payment nature of the optimal contract is also reminiscent of observed features
of health insurance or car insurance: such insurance can typically only be obtained (or only
be obtained for ”reasonable” premia), if the agent is currently healthy or the driving record
is currently clean: the insurance continues, if conditions worsen.
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class of models are Phelan (1995) and Lustig (2001).5 As in this paper, Phelan
(1995) considers an environment where agents can leave the current contract and
sign up with another principal. Phelan, too, shows that autarky will not result.
However, he assumes that agents can only leave the contract at the beginning
of the period, without knowledge of their period income, effectively introducing
partial commitment via a one-period waiting time for exiting the contract. With
this timing assumption Phelan would actually obtain a full insurance result
(not only in the long run, but immediately), would he not assume that the
principal cannot observe the endowment of the agent. If endowments were
observable in his environment, there would be no reason for an agent to exit
even a full insurance contract before knowing her endowment. In contrast,
in our full information environment, the agent may exit after she learns her
endowments and would surely leave if required to make large payments without
future compensation, as in a full insurance contract.
Lustig (2001) endogenizes the outside option in an environment akin to Al-
varez and Jermann (2000), in which a small number of agents with income risk
enter long-term contracts with endogenous borrowing constraints. Lustig’s in-
novation is to introduce a durable good and to assume that agents lose their
collateral upon defaulting on long-term contracts. There are no further punish-
ments from defaulting, and agents can immediately trade in financial markets
after default. Consequently in his model all trades are fully collateralized. Our
assumption of allowing agents to re-enter contractual relationships is similar to
Lustig’s. His work, however, focuses on asset pricing consequences in the pres-
ence of aggregate uncertainty, when the number of participating agents is small,
while our paper studies the allocational consequences of long-term contracts
with the option of re-contracting, assuming a large number of agents and no
aggregate uncertainty. Second, while a durable asset is a necessary ingredient
in his model, the stark implications in our paper derive from its absence.6
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
defines equilibrium. Section 3 provides the analysis. After proving existence of
equilibrium, we argue that, depending on the relationship between the discount
factor of agents and the interest rate, either no, full or partial risk sharing is
possible. The following subsections then analyze these cases in turn: subsection
5For an example of endogenizing the outside option to long-term relationships by compe-
tition in a very different environment, see Ghosh and Ray (1996).
6Another literature that studies consumption insurance with long-term contracts derives
incomplete risk-sharing from the presence of private information and moral hazard. In this
literature it is usually assumed that both agents and competitive principals can commit to the
long-term contract. Competition of principals for agents takes place only at the first period,
with no re-contracting allowed at future dates. Green (1987) offers a partial equilibrium
treatment of such an economy, while Atkeson and Lucas (1992, 1995) extend the analysis to
general equilibrium, Atkeson (1991) applies such a model to sovereign lending, Phelan (1994)
incorporates aggregate shocks and Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988) study the importance
of commitment to long-term contracts in achieving efficient allocations in a dynamic moral
hazard environment.
Whether a sequence of short-term contracts is able to attain outcomes as good as long-term
contracts under private information is also the central point of investigation in the work of
Fudenberg et al. (1990) and Rey and Salanie (1990, 1996).
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3.3 provides the upper bound for the interest rate which allows for the autarky
result. In section 3.4 we provide a complete characterization of the contract in
the case of iid income and βR = 1, resulting in full risk sharing and constant
consumption above average income in the limit. For the iid two-income case,
we also provide a complete characterization of the partial insurance equilibrium
for βR < 1 in subsection 3.5. Finally, in subsection 3.6 we show that there is
a general duality between the long-term contracts economy considered in this
paper and a consumption-savings problem with state-contingent one-period Ar-
row securities and borrowing constraints. We also show that one can reinterpret
competition with other principals as a requirement that the contract is proof
from renegotiation demands by the agent. Section 4 concludes. A sequential
formulation of the game between agents and principals can be found in appendix
A. A separate appendix contains details of the longer proofs in the main text.7
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
The economy consists of a continuum of principals j ∈ [0, 1], each initially
associated with a measure µj ≥ 0 of atomless agents. The total population of
atomless “agents” is
P
j µj = 1. We denote a generic agent by i.
Each individual i has a stochastic endowment process {yt,i}∞t=0 of the sin-
gle consumption good with finite support Y = {y1, . . . ym}, m ≥ 2, drawn as
Markov process with strictly positive transition probabilities π(y0|y). We as-
sume that Y is ordered: yj−1 < yj for all j = 2, . . . ,m. Endowment realizations
are publicly observable. Let Π denote the stationary measure associated with
π, and note that it is unique. Also assume that
P
y yΠ(y) = 1 and that the
initial distribution over endowments at each principal at date 0 is given by Π.
Agents value consumption according to the utility function
U((ct,i)
∞
t=0) = (1− β)E0
" ∞X
t=0
βtu(ct,i)
#
(1)
where u : R+ → D is the period utility function, with range D, and where
0 < β < 1. We assume that u(c) is continuously differentiable, strictly concave
and strictly increasing in c and satisfies the Inada conditions.
A principal j has no endowment of the consumption good and consumes γt,j
in period t. We explicitly allow consumption or “cash flow” of the principal,
γt,j , to be negative. This also avoids ever having to worry about bankruptcy of
a principal. The principal is risk neutral and values consumption according to
U (P )
¡
(γt,j)
∞
t=0
¢
=
µ
1− 1
R
¶
E0
" ∞X
t=0
γt,j
Rt
#
(2)
7Available at http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/professoren/krueger/harapp.pdf
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where 0 < 1R < 1 is the discount factor of the principal and an exogenous
parameter of the model, which can also be interpreted as the exogenous gross
interest rate. We allow this interest rate to differ from the discount factor β
of the agent. The normalization with the factor (1 − 1/R) has the advantage,
that a constant γt,j ≡ γ results in U(P ) = γ, so that both are expressed in the
same units; this simplifies some of the expressions below (a similar argument
justifies the normalization of the agents’ utility function by (1− β)). One may
interpret U(P ) as the net present value of a stream of cash flow γt,j discounted
at the market return R, assuming that goods can be traded across principals,
although we do not explore this interpretation further to keep matters simple.8
For each principal the resource constraint posits that
Yt,j = Ct,j + γt,j (3)
where Yt,j =
R
yt,iµj(di) is total endowment of agents associated with principal
j and Ct,j =
R
ct,iµj(di) is total consumption of these agents.
2.2 Market Structure
In this economy agents wish to obtain insurance against stochastic endowment
fluctuations from risk neutral principals. We want to characterize long-term
consumption insurance contracts that competitive profit-maximizing principals
offer to agents that cannot commit to honor these contracts. After the realiza-
tion of income yt,i, but before consumption takes place, an agent is free to leave
the principal and join a competitor. She takes the current income realization
with her. We assume that moving is ”painful” to the agent, inflicting a disutility
ν(yt,i) ≥ 0. For most of the paper, we will concentrate on the case ν(.) ≡ 0,
that is, moving carries no direct cost. A principal has the ability to commit
to long-term contracts with his agents, but has no ability to reach them in the
future, once they have left for a competitor. In short, this is an environment
with one-sided commitment.9
We now formulate a game of competition between principals, offering con-
sumption contracts to potential movers and to agents already with the principal.
We proceed directly to the recursive formulation of each individual principal’s
optimization problem, and then to define a symmetric stationary recursive equi-
librium. We thereby skip the step of first describing the game as unfolding
sequentially; for completeness, that formulation can be found in appendix A.
8Remember that our principals are risk-neutral and can consume negative amounts. Al-
ternatively, one may re-interpret R as the world gross interest rate at which principals can
freely borrow or save.
9 Section 3.6 demonstrates that the same consumption allocation as with long-term con-
tracts arises if agents are allowed to trade one-period state-contingent savings-loan contracts,
subject to judiciously specified short-sale constraints. In that section we also discuss the con-
nection between our long-term competitive contracts and renegotiation-proof contracts in a
bilateral bargaining game between a single principal and agent.
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2.3 Recursive Equilibrium
An agent enters the period with current state (y,w), describing her current
income y and the expected discounted utility w from the contract she had been
promised by the principal last period. The fact that utility promises w and the
current shock y form a sufficient description of an agent’s state, in the sense
that the resulting policy functions of the recursive problem induce consumption
and investment sequences that solve the corresponding sequential optimization
problem, has been demonstrated by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) for a private
information economy and adapted to the environment presented here by Krueger
(1999). Both papers borrow the idea of promised utility as a state variable from
Abreu, Pierce and Stacchetti (1986) and Spear and Srivastava (1987).
The objective of the principal is to maximize the contribution to his own
lifetime utility (lifetime profit) from the contract with a particular agent. He
is constrained to deliver the utility promise w by giving the agent current con-
sumption c and utility promises from next period onwards, contingent on next
period’s income realization, w0(y0). If the principal promises less utility from
tomorrow onward in a particular income realization y0 than a competing princi-
pal, the agent will leave the location, and the principal makes zero profits from
the contract with that particular agent from then on.10 We denote the utility
promise by competing principals as UOut(y0), which the principal takes as given
(but which is determined in equilibrium). The recursive problem of a principal
can be stated as
P (y,w) = max
c,{w0(y0)}y0∈Y
µ
1− 1
R
¶
(y − c) + (4)
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)
(
P (y0, w0(y0)) if w0(y0) ≥ UOut(y0)− ν(y0)
0 if w0(y0) < UOut(y0)− ν(y0)
s.t. w = (1− β)u(c) + β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)w0(y0) (5)
where ν(y0) is the ”pain” of moving to a competing principal.
The promise keeping constraint (5) says that the principal delivers lifetime
utility w to an agent which was promised w, either by allocating current or future
utility to the agent. This constraint of the principal makes our assumption of
one-sided commitment explicit: in contrast to the agents principals are assumed
to be able to commit to the long-term relationship. Finally, that continuation
profits split into two parts is due to the fact that, in order to retain an agent,
the principal has to guarantee her at least as much continuation utility, in any
contingency, as the agent would obtain from a competing principal.
10 If the agent is indifferent, we make the tie-breaking assumption that the agent stays
with the current principal. Note that an agent always finds it preferable to sign up with
a competing intermediary rather than live in financial autarky (even if she could save in a
risk-free technology with gross return R) because a financial intermediary offers contracts that
smooth consumpion across states and not only across time.
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Let us now consider what our assumption of competition among principals
amounts to. For a principal it only makes sense to attract a new agent if the
profit from this new contract is non-negative. On the other hand, suppose that
an agent could be attracted with a contract generating positive profit. Then
another principal could make a profit by offering a slightly better contract.
Hence, perfect competition between principals implies that the profit from a new
contract exactly equals zero and that the utility promised to the newcomer is
the highest utility promise achievable subject to this constraint. We require the
result of this argument as an equilibrium condition by imposing that UOut(y)
equals the highest lifetime utility w satisfying P (y,w) = 0.
Given this condition we can simplify the dynamic programming problem
above, as the principal is always indifferent between letting an agent go by
offering w0(y0) < UOut(y0) − ν(y0) or letting him stay by offering him exactly
w0(y0) = UOut(y0) − ν(y0) and making zero expected profits from tomorrow
onwards. We restrict attention to the latter case.11 The dynamic programming
problem (4) can then be restated as a cost minimization problem
V (y,w) = min
c,{w0(y0)}y0∈Y
µ
1− 1
R
¶
c+
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)V (y0, w0(y0)) (6)
s.t. w = (1− β)u(c) + β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)w0(y0) (7)
w0(y0) ≥ UOut(y0)− ν(y0) for all y0 ∈ Y (8)
where (8) now captures the constraints that competition impose on the principal
and the argument above that it is never strictly beneficial for a principal to lose
an agent to a competing principal.
With this recursive formulation of the principal’s problem we can now re-
state the zero-profit condition. Let a(y) be the (normalized) present discounted
value of the endowment stream discounted at interest rate R and given current
endowment y. Hence a(y) is defined recursively as
a(y) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
y +
1
R
X
y0
π(y0|y)a(y0) (9)
One can read a(y) as the human wealth of an agent with current income y,
as evaluated by the principal. Perfect competition implies that the normalized
expected net present value of consumption spent on this agent exactly equals
her human wealth a(y), i.e.
V (y, UOut(y)) = a(y) for all y ∈ Y (10)
and that the utility UOut(y) promised to a newcomer is the highest utility
promise achievable subject to the principal breaking even.
11 If ν(y) = 0 for all y this restriction is without loss of generality, since an agent starts the
next period with promise UOut(y0), independent of whether she moved or not.
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In order to define equilibrium we have to precisely fix the domain of admis-
sible utility promises. Let W = [w, w¯] be this domain, with w being its lower
and w¯ its upper bound and let Z = Y × [w, w¯]. For the results to follow it is
useful to provide explicit bounds [w, w¯]. To do so define a¯ = maxj a(yj) and
w¯ = max
(ct)∞t=0
(1− β)
∞X
t=0
βtu(ct)
s.t.
µ
1− 1
R
¶ ∞X
t=0
1
Rt
ct ≤ a¯ (11)
That is, w¯ is the lifetime utility an agent with highest lifetime income a¯ could
maximally receive from a principal who does not worry about the agent leaving
the contract at some future point and who wishes to avoid a loss.12 Furthermore,
pick some 0 < y < y1 and define w = u(y). Note that w < minj waut(yj) (where
waut(yj) is the utility from consuming its income forever, given current income
yj) That is, w is the lifetime utility from consuming a constant endowment
y smaller than the lowest income realization y1. In order to assure that the
dynamic programming problem of the principal is always well-defined we impose
Condition 1 The bounds [w, w¯] satisfy
w > (1− β) inf(D) + βw¯ (12)
where D is the range of the period utility function.
Note that this condition, purely in terms of fundamentals of the economy,
is always satisfied for utility functions that are unbounded below (e.g. CRRA
functions with σ ≥ 1). For other period utility functions, for w¯ as defined above
and a given w = u(y) there always exists a β ∈ (0, 1) low enough such that
condition 1 is satisfied. We are now ready to define a symmetric stationary
recursive competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2 A symmetric stationary recursive equilibrium is functions V :
Z → R, c : Z → R+, w0 : Z × Y → [w, w¯], UOut : Y → [w, w¯], principal
consumption γ ∈ R and a positive measure Φ on the Borel sets of Z such that
1. (Solution of Bellman equation): V solves the functional equation above
and c, w0 are the associated policies, given UOut(y0) for all y0 ∈ Y
2. (Feasibility)
γ +
Z
(c(y,w)− y) dΦ = 0 (13)
12For example, if u(c) = (c1−σ − 1)/(1 − σ), a tedious but simple calculation shows that
w¯ = u(c¯), where
c¯ =
1−R−1(βR)1/σ
1−R−1
(
1− β
1− β(βR)((1/σ)−1)
) 1
1−σ
a¯ ≤ a¯ for βR ≤ 1
with the inequality strict for βR < 1 and σ <∞.
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3. (Outside Option): for all y ∈ Y
UOut(y) ∈ argmax
w
{w|V (y,w) = a(y)} (14)
4. (Stationary Distribution)
Φ = H(Φ) (15)
where H is the law of motion for the measure over (y,w) induced by the
income transition matrix π and the optimal policy function w0.
The law of motion H is given as follows. The exogenous Markov chain π for
income together with the policy function w0 define a Markov transition function
on the measurable space (Z,B(Z)) where B(Z) denotes the Borel sigma algebra
on Z. Define the transition function Q : Z ×B(Z)→ [0, 1] by
Q((y,w), A) =
X
y0∈Y
½
π(y0|y) if (y0, w0(y,w; y0)) ∈ A
0 else
(16)
for all A ∈ B(Z). Then the law of motion is defined as
H(Φ)(A) =
Z
Q(z,A)Φ(dz) for all A ∈ B(Z) (17)
Two comments are in order. First, the range for w defined by [w, w¯] is
meant to precisely fix the domain of the relevant functions rather than act
as another restriction. Second, agents arrive with a “blank” history at a new
principal, i.e. the principal does not make particular use of the information that
new arrivals must be agents who have previously defaulted. This assumption
rules out cooperation (e.g. via credit rating agencies) by principals in punishing
defaulting agents.13 While it might be interesting to study an extension allowing
for such institutions, the assumption of perfect competition among principals is
not different from the usual assumption maintained in Walrasian economies.14
3 Analysis
The analysis of our model contains several parts. In subsection 3.1 we establish
basic properties of the principals’ dynamic program problem and in subsec-
tion 3.2. we prove existence of equilibrium. Subsections 3.3 to 3.6. contain
13One justification for this is that it is not in the competing principals’ best interest to
honor such cooperation ex-post.
14 In the context of the sovereign debt literature Kletzer and Wright (2000) study an economy
with one borrower countries and multiple lenders. By allowing lenders to act strategically and
punish lenders who offer contracts inducing agents to leave the original lender some souvereign
debt can be sustained. Our assumption of perfect competition is meant to rule out such
strategic (or alternatively, cooperative) behavior among principals; our analysis thus provides
a complement to theirs. Our assumption of perfect competition has the additional appeal that
the informational requirements for the principals are substantially lower than with strategic
interactions among principals.
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characterizations of the equilibrium risk sharing contract under different as-
sumptions about the relative magnitude of the time discount factor of agents,
β, and principal, 1R . Finally, subsection 3.7. argues that the consumption alloca-
tions characterized in the previous subsection would also arise as a solution to a
simple consumption-savings problem or as an outcome of a renegotiation-proof
bilateral contract between a single principle and agent.
3.1 Properties of the Bellman Equation
Let us first state properties of solutions to the dynamic programming problem
of the principal. Define the cost function C : D → R+ as the inverse of the
period utility function u. That is, C(u) is the consumption needed to deliver
current utility u. From the properties of the utility function it follows that
C(.) is strictly convex, differentiable, strictly increasing, and infu∈D C(u) = 0
and supu∈D C(u) =∞. Rather than current consumption c we let the principal
choose current utility h = u(c) with associated cost C(h). The Bellman equation
then reads as
V (y,w) = min
h∈D,{w0(y0)∈[w,w¯]}y0∈Y
µ
1− 1
R
¶
C(h) +
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)V (y0, w0(y0))
(18)
s.t. w = (1− β)h+ β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)w0(y0) (19)
and subject to (8). We define an optimal contract, given outside options, as
solution to the dynamic programming problem of the principal, or formally
Definition 3 Given [w, w¯] and UOut(y)y∈Y in [w, w¯], an optimal contract for³
(UOut(y))y∈Y , w, w¯
´
is a solution V (y,w) to the Bellman equation on the do-
main Z together with associated decision rules h = h(y,w), w0(y0) = w0(y,w; y0).
We are now ready to establish basic properties of the optimal contract (dy-
namic program) of the principal.
Proposition 4 Let outside options (UOut(y))y∈Y ∈ [w, w¯] and β < 1 < R be
given. Further suppose that condition 1 is satisfied. Then, an optimal contract
for
³
(UOut(y))y∈Y , w, w¯
´
exists and has the following properties.
1. V (y,w) is strictly convex, strictly increasing, continuous and differentiable
in w.
2. The decision rules are unique and continuous.
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3. The decision rules and the value function satisfy the first order conditions
and the envelope condition
(1− β)λ =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
C0(h) (20)
λβ =
1
R
∂V
∂w
(y0, w0(y,w; y0))− µ(y0) (21)
λ =
∂V
∂w
(y,w) (22)
λ ≥ 0 (23)
µ(y0) ≥ 0, for all y0 ∈ Y (24)
where λ and µ(y0) are the Lagrange multipliers on the first and second
constraints.
4. The decision rule h(y,w) is strictly increasing in w. The decision rule
w0(y,w; y0) is weakly increasing in w, and strictly so, if the continuing
participation constraint w0(y,w; y0) ≥ UOut(y0)− ν(y0) is not binding.
5. If the income process is iid, then V (y,w) depends on w alone, V (y,w) ≡
V (w). If additionally UOut(y0) − ν(y0) is weakly increasing in y0, then
w0(y,w; y0) is weakly increasing in y0.
Proof. All arguments are similar to those in Krueger (1999) and fairly
standard, apart possibly from the strict convexity of the value function. We will
give a sketch of the argument here and defer details to the technical appendix.
1. Assumption 1 assures that the constraint set is non-empty. A standard
contraction mapping argument then assures existence, strict monotonicity
and convexity of V . Strict convexity follows from the equivalence of the
sequential and recursive formulation of the problem where the strict con-
vexity of the value function of the sequential problem follows from strict
convexity of the cost function C.
2. Differentiability of V can now be shown (for which strict convexity of V
is crucial). Uniqueness of decision rules follow from strict convexity of V,
and continuity from the tgeorem of the maximum.
3. These are standard first order and envelope conditions.
4. From first order conditions and strict convexity of C and V (in w).
5. Current income y appears in the Bellman equation only in the probabilities
π(y0|y), independent of y in the iid case. The properties for w0(w, y; y0)
follow from the first order conditions and strict convexity of V .
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The first order conditions above have easily interpretable consequences15 for
consumption paths, given values for outside options UOut(·). They imply
C0(h(y,w))
(
= 1βRC
0 (h(y0, w0(y,w; y0))) if w0(y,w; y0) > UOut(y0)
≤ 1βRC 0 (h(y0, w0(y,w; y0))) if w0(y,w; y0) = UOut(y0)
(25)
or — written in terms of consumption —
u0(c(y,w))
(
= βRu0 (c(y0, w0(y,w; y0))) if w0(y,w; y0) > UOut(y0)
≥ βRu0 (c(y0, w0(y,w; y0))) if w0(y,w; y0) = UOut(y0) (26)
In particular, for βR = 1, consumption never falls, but may ratchet upwards,
whenever the constraint of the outside option is binding. Thus, for βR = 1,
consumption eventually stays constant, which is the case of “full insurance”. In
section 3.4, we investigate and describe the resulting equilibrium. If βR < 1,
consumption keeps falling as long as the constraint of the outside option is not
binding. The equilibrium for this case is investigated in sections 3.3 and 3.5.16
Since current utility h and thus current consumption c are strictly increasing
functions of utility promises w, the consumption dynamics can be perfectly de-
duced from the dynamics of utility promises. Before characterizing equilibrium
in detail we give an overview over our findings, using three figures that plot the
optimal utility promises tomorrow, w0(y0) against utility promises today. For
these figures, it has been assumed that there are two income states, y1 < y2,
and that income is iid. Also plotted is the expected discounted future utility
promise β
P
y0 π(y
0)w0(y0), since the vertical distance of this line and the 450-line
amounts to current utility (1 − β)h = (1− β)u(c). Figure 1 pertains to a very
impatient agent (relative to the interest rate), figure 2 shows the case where the
agent is as patient as the principal, and figure 3 exhibits an intermediate case.
In Figure 1 the agent is very impatient, relative to the principal. For low
β it is optimal for the principal to give high current utility (1 − β)u(c) and
low continuation utilities, subject to the constraints w0(y0) ≥ UOut(y0). For
all current promises w ∈ [UOut(y1), UOut(y2)] the continuation promises are
always at the constraint: w0(y0) = UOut(y0). An agent starting with current
promises w = UOut(y2) (point A), upon receiving one bad shock moves to
w0 = UOut(y1) (point B via C), and an agent with one good shock moves
from point B to A (via D). Note that agents, at no point in the contract, have
15We are grateful to a careful reader for suggesting this perspective.
16 It is worth mentioning that for the properties of the insurance contract only the relation
between β and 1
R
matters, but not the absolute value of β < 1. This is in contrast to models
with exogenous outside option given by autarky. In these models there is a threshold β¯ < 1
such that autarky is so bad for discount factors above this level (because the lack of future
insurance becomes more and more severe) that perfect insurance can be enforced by the
threat of exclusion. Here perfect insurance (only in the limit) is obtained only if Rβ = 1,
independent of the absolute level of β. Whereas in the model with exogenous outside option
only β determines the value of this option, in our model both β and R matter for it, since the
latter determines the present discounted value of the endowment stream.
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No insurance: patient principal
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UOut(y2)UOut(y1)
Figure 1:
continuation utility higher than their outside option (i.e. the principal does not
share risk with the agent). We will show in section 3.3 that for a sufficiently low
βR the stationary equilibrium is autarky: the equilibrium outside options equal
the utility obtained consuming the endowment in each period, the allocation
equals the autarkic allocation, and the stationary promise distribution has only
positive mass Π(y) at UOut(y).
Figure 2 depicts the other extreme, with agents and principal equally patient,
and thus βR = 1. Now it is beneficial for the principal to economize on current
utility and give high utility promises from tomorrow onwards. For iid income
shocks future promises coincide with the 450-line whenever w ≥ UOut(y0) and
are constrained by UOut(y0) below these points. It is easy to see (we will
formalize this in section 3.4) that, as the agent experiences good income shocks,
continuation utility and future consumption move up (to UOut(ymax) and the
corresponding consumption level) and stay there forever: eventually an agents’
consumption is perfectly smooth as he obtains complete consumption insurance.
Finally, Figure 3 shows an intermediate case in which partial insurance ob-
tains. Consider an agent with current utility promise w = UOut(y2) (point A).
If this agent experiences a bad income shock y0 = y1 her future utility promise
w0(y0) is lower than today’s promise (and the same is true for consumption).
However, the drop in promises and consumption is not as drastic as in Figure 1:
now it takes two bad income shocks to hit UOut(y1) (from point A via D to B).
Thus, the agent is partially insured against income risk. However, in contrast to
Figure 2 insurance is not perfect: utility promises and consumption drop with
14
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Figure 2:
a low income realization, even for an agent that previously had worked herself
up to point A. For the iid case with two income shocks, section 3.5 below will
provide a complete characterization of the consumption dynamics, including the
optimal number and size of downward consumption steps shown in Figure 3.
3.2 Existence and Properties of Equilibrium
In this section we establish general properties of our model. If condition 1 is
satisfied, existence of an equilibrium can be guaranteed.
Proposition 5 Let condition 1 be satisfied. Then an optimal contract and out-
side options
n
UOut(y)
o
y∈Y
satisfying (14) exist. Furthermore, an equilibrium
exists.
Proof. Again we defer details to the technical appendix. There we first
prove that there exist outside options UOut = (UOut(y1), . . . , UOut(ym)) and
associated value and policy functions V
UOut , hUOut , w
0
UOut
(y0) of the princi-
pals solving V
UOut(y, U
Out(y)) = a(y) for all y. Then we prove that the Markov
transition function induced by π and w0
UOut
(y0) has a stationary distribution.
For the first part define the function f : [w, w¯]m → [w, w¯]m by
fj
h
UOut
i
= min{w˜ ∈ [w, w¯] : V
UOut(yj , w˜) ≥ a(yj)} for all j = 1, . . . ,m
(27)
15
ww‘
UOut(y1)
UOut(y2)
45o
Medium patience of the principal: partial insurance
w‘(y2)> UOut(y2)
w‘(y1)
A
D
BC
w1=UOut(y1) w2 w3=UOut(y2)
w3
w2
w1
Figure 3:
We need to show three things: 1) The function f is well defined on all of
[w, w¯]m, 2) The function f is continuous, 3) Any fixed point w∗ of f satisfies
Vw∗(yj , w∗j ) = a(yj) for all j = 1, . . . ,m. Part 1 is straightforward.17 Part 2)
requires to show that the cost function V
UOut(., .) is uniformly continuous in the
outside options UOut (which is involved, but not conceptually difficult, and for
which assumption 1 is again needed assure that the cost function is well defined
for all possible outside options UOut). Finally, part 3) has to rule out that at
the fixed point of f we have Vw∗(yj , w∗) > a(yj), which is done by constructing
an allocation that attains lifetime utility w∗ at costs lower than Vw∗ (which is
nontrivial and again requires condition 1).
For the second part we establish that π and w0(y,w; y0) indeed induce a
well-defined Markov transition function which satisfies the Feller property. The
fact that w0 is continuous in w assures this. Then theorem 12.10 in Stokey,
Lucas and Prescott (1989) guarantees the existence of a stationary measure Φ
(although not its uniqueness).
The following proposition says that the contracts cannot be too generous
at the sign-up date and thus demonstrates the general result in our environ-
ment that the insurance contracts require a nonnegative pre-payment or con-
17Note, however, that the more natural definition of f as
V
UOut (yj , fj
[
UOut
]
) = a(yj)} for all j = 1, . . . ,m
would have made it impossible to show that f is well-defined on all of [w, w¯], unless very
restrictive assumptions on [w, w¯] are made.
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tract initiation fee. The proposition is also useful for further characterizing the
equilibrium below (e.g. in proposition 11).
Proposition 6 It cannot be the case that c(y, UOut(y)) > y for any y ∈ Y.
Proof. Suppose that c(yˆ, UOut(yˆ)) > yˆ. Equation (6) becomes
V (yˆ, UOut(yˆ)) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
c(yˆ, UOut(yˆ)) +
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|yˆ)V (y0, w0(yˆ, UOut(yˆ); y0))
>
µ
1− 1
R
¶
yˆ +
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|yˆ)V (y0, UOut(y0))
=
µ
1− 1
R
¶
yˆ +
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|yˆ)a(y0) = a(yˆ) (28)
The inequality in the equation follows from the assumption and the fact that
w0(yˆ, UOut(yˆ); y0) ≥ UOut(y0)) by the participation constraint of the agent as
well as the fact that V is strictly increasing (as shown in proposition 4). But
this is a contradiction to (10).
The following property is interesting, intuitive and also useful for the analysis
to follow. It says, that an agent cannot be made better off by waiting in autarky
for one more period before signing up to a contract.
Proposition 7
UOut(y) ≥ (1− β)u(y) + β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)UOut(y0) (29)
Proof. Let
wˆ = (1− β)u(y) + β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)UOut(y0) (30)
Consider a principal who offers consumption c = y and continuation utilities
w0(y0) = UOut(y0) to an agent entitled to the promise wˆ, using the cost mini-
mizing contract from tomorrow onwards. With equation (10) and (9), the cost
V˜ of this contract is
V˜ =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
y +
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)a(y0) = a(y) (31)
Thus, V (y, wˆ) ≤ a(y) and therefore UOut(y) ≥ wˆ.
A useful property of the equilibrium for our further analysis is that the
outside option of an agent is an increasing function of his income.
Proposition 8 Suppose the income process is iid. Then in any equilibrium
UOut(y) is strictly increasing in y.
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Proof. UOut(y) solves V (UOut(y)) = a(y). The result follows since a(y)
is strictly increasing in y and since V (w) is increasing in w.18
3.3 No Risk Sharing: Autarky
For the remainder of this section we assume that ν(y) ≡ 0, that is, there are no
direct costs of switching intermediaries. As a starting point of our characteriza-
tion of equilibrium, we shall analyze conditions, under which the principals do
not have to make net payments in the long run, i.e. we seek equilibria which
also deliver the following condition:19
Definition 9 (Nonnegative steady state cash flow condition:)
γ =
Z
(y − V (y,w))dΦ ≥ 0 (32)
Leaving a location has no consequences for an agents’ ability to engage in
future risk sharing arrangements and generates no cost other than giving up
current promises w. One may interpret the promise w as relationship capital:
the principal guarantees a particular level of happiness to the agent as a conse-
quence of past events. Our first proposition shows that the threat of losing this
goodwill is not enough to support risk sharing, if the principals need to enjoy
nonnegative cash flow in steady state.
Proposition 10 Assume ν(y) ≡ 0, y ∈ Y .
1. If an equilibrium satisfies the nonnegative steady state profit condition,
then it has to implement the autarkic allocation almost everywhere (a.e):
c(y,w) = y Φ− a.e. (33)
2. Conversely, if an equilibrium implements the autarkic allocation, then the
nonnegative steady state profit condition is satisfied.
Proof. Remember that in any equilibrium V (y,w) has to be weakly increas-
ing in w. For (y,w) ∈ supp Φ, we must have w ≥ UOut(y) and thus
V (y,w) ≥ V (y, UOut(y)) = a(y) (34)
18One may think that this proposition can be proved with the weaker condition that π(.|y)
first oder stochastically dominates π(.|yˆ) if y > yˆ. Under this assumption a(y) is still strictly
increasing in y and V (y, w) is still increasing in w. But if V (y,w) is strictly increasing in y
(which we verified numerically to often be the case), the result does not follow.
19An alternative interpretation of this condition is to view y as contributions to bank or
pension account with a financial intermediary, and consumption allocations as withdrawals
from that account. Then V (y,w) measures the present discounted value of all future with-
drawals. The condition then requires that in the steady state contributions to be at least as
large as withdrawals. In other words, the condition requires the steady state value of assets
already in the account to be nonpositive.
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On the other hand, the assumed non-negativity of γ together withX
y∈Y
a(y)Π(y) =
X
y∈Y
yΠ(y) = E[y] (35)
implies Z
V (y,w)dΦ ≤ E[y] =
Z
a(y)dΦ (36)
Together,
V (y,w) = a(y) Φ− a.e. (37)
Now, comparing the two equations
V (y,w) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
c(y,w) +
1
R
X
y0
π(y0|y)V (y0, w0(y,w; y0)) (38)
a(y) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
y +
1
R
X
y0
π(y0|y)a(y0) (39)
shows that c(y,w) = y almost everywhere. The second part of the proposition
follows trivially from the definitions
The equilibrium distribution Φ in proposition 10 is easy to calculate. Since
agents consume their endowment, it follows that their remaining lifetime utility
is given by the continuation utility from consuming the stochastic income stream
in each period, starting with current income y. This utility from “autarky”
waut(y) is recursively defined as
waut(y) = (1− β)u(y) + β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)waut(y0). (40)
The distribution Φ therefore assigns weight Π(y) to the atoms (y,waut(y))
and zero to everything else. Proposition 10 says that any equilibrium must
necessarily have c(y,waut(y)) = y for all y ∈ Y . Similarly, the promised utility
at these points is obviously w0(y,waut(y); y
0) = waut(y
0). Comparing the result
above to the definition of an equilibrium, we see that the proposition does not
yet deliver the full specification required for a stationary equilibrium. Such a
specification requires the consumption function as well as all other functions
listed in the equilibrium definition to be defined on the set Z = Y × [w, w¯]
rather than just the support of Φ. If we restricted the domain Z to just include
the support of Φ, proposition 10 would essentially establish that we always have
an equilibrium implementing autarky. With that assumption, the principals
would have no choice but to implement the autarky solution! They would not
be allowed to deviate from the autarky utility promises, even if they preferred
to do so. Or, assume instead that Z = {(y, w¯) | y ∈ Y } where w¯ = u(E[y]) is
the utility promise from complete risk sharing. In that case, principals would
have no choice but to always implement the complete risk sharing solution.
Thus choices of the domain Z of this type would completely predetermine the
outcome.
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Now we aim at constructing the equilibrium contract on the entire set Z =
Y × [w, w¯]. This requirement of the equilibrium turns out to have bite in that
it rules out the existence of equilibria satisfying the nonnegative steady state
cash flow condition for some R altogether and leads to the explicit and unique
construction of the equilibrium functions outside the support of Φ otherwise.
Indeed, in part 3.4, where we dispense with the non-negativity of cash flow,
we shall obtain complete risk sharing if Rβ = 1 and income is iid. This is
obviously squarely at odds with the autarky result above. The next proposition
shows, that no equilibrium satisfying the nonnegative cash flow in steady state
condition exists for Rβ = 1, thus resolving this conflict.
For the autarky result to hold we need to rule out that a principal would find
it profitable to deviate from an equilibrium in which all other principals offer the
autarky contract: this can be achieved under the assumption that the principal
is sufficiently patient (interest rates are low enough). Intuitively, deviating from
the autarky solution involves offering a agent with a high income now a better
contract by taking some of his current endowment for the promise of additional
consumption goods in future periods, when his endowment is low. A sufficiently
patient principal is deterred by the future costs of sticking to such a contract.
Based on this argument, we expect there to be an upper bound on the interest
rate R for the autarky result to emerge.
Our next result below shows that this is indeed the case.20 Define
haut(y,w) =
w − βPy0∈Y π(y0|y)waut(y0)
1− β (41)
Note that haut(y,waut(y)) = u(y), see equation (40). Define
w¯m(y) = max{w|C(haut(y,w)) ≤ ym} (42)
Proposition 11 Assume that condition 1 holds.
1. An equilibrium satisfying the nonnegative steady state cash flow condition
exists, if and only if
R ∈ (1, R¯] (43)
where
R¯ =
1
β
C0(u(y1))
C0(u(ym))
=
1
β
u0(ym)
u0(y1))
(44)
Moreover, no equilibria exist that violate the nonnegative steady state cash
flow condition, if condition (44) is satisfied.
2. Given condition (44), the equilibrium has the following form for y ∈ Y
20We are grateful to a careful reader for correcting an earlier version of this proposition and
suggesting the proof strategy to us.
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and w ≤ w¯m(y)
V (y,w) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
(C(haut(y,w))− y) + a(y) (45)
c(y,w) = C(haut(y,w)) (46)
w0(y,w; y0) = waut(y
0) (47)
UOut(y) = waut(y) (48)
cash flow γ = 0 and a positive measure Φ as constructed above.21
3. Suppose that βR = 1. Then, no equilibrium satisfying the nonnegative
steady state cash flow condition exists.
Proof.
1. (a) Suppose that R > R¯ and assume that an equilibrium satisfies the
nonnegative cash flow condition. Now take y = ym, w = UOut(ym)
and y0 = y1. Proposition 10 implies that w0(ym, w; y1) = UOut(y1).
Furthermore it implies that
c(y1, w
0(ym, w; y1)) = c(y1, UOut(y1)) = y1 (49)
c(ym, U
Out(ym)) = ym (50)
But then
u0(ym) = u0(c(ym, UOut(ym)) ≥ βRu0(c(y1, w0(ym, UOut(ym); y1)))
> βR¯u0(c(y1, w0(ym, UOut(ym); y1))) =
u0(ym)
u0(y1)
u0(y1) (51)
a contradiction. Here the first equality is due to (50), the first in-
equality due to equation (26), the second inequality due to the as-
sumption R > R¯ and the last equality comes from the definition of
R¯.Thus an equilibrium satisfying the nonnegative cash flow condition
cannot exist if R > R¯
(b) Conversely, suppose that R ≤ R¯. The proof proceeds in two steps,
with the first providing an important auxiliary result.
i. Take an arbitrary (y,w) with c(y,w) < y. We want to show
that then w < UOut(y). For any y0 ∈ Y either w0(y,w;w0) =
UOut(y0) or w0(y,w;w0) > UOut(y0). In the later case by the
assumption R ≤ R¯, the definition of R¯ and equation (26)
βRu0(y1) ≤ βR¯u0(y1) = u0(ym) ≤ u0(y) < u0(c(y,w)) = βRu0(c(y0, w0(y,w; y0))
(52)
21Due to (26) and the low value for R, see (44), a contract offering consumption c =
ym and autarky from next period onwards cannot be improved upon. For promise levels
w > w¯m(y) implying higher consumption levels, one may need several “steps” to reach the
autarky solution, but will get there eventually. It is not hard, but tedious and not particularly
insightful to spell out the contractual details also for these initial high levels of promises.
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and thus c(y0, w0(y,w;w0) < y0. Thus consumption remains be-
low income tomorrow or w0(y,w;w0) = UOut(y0). Consequently,
iterating on the promise keeping constraint from tomorrow on
we have w0(y0) ≤ UOut(y0). Thus
w = (1− β)u(c(y,w)) + β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)w0(y,w; y0)
< (1− β)u(y) + β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)UOut(y0) ≤ UOut(y)(53)
where the last inequality is due to (29).
ii. The previous result implies that for all y we have c(y, UOut(y)) ≥
y. Then proposition 6 implies that c(y, UOut(y)) = y for all
y. We finally show that R ≤ R¯ and c(y, UOut(y)) = y for all
y imply that the equilibrium satisfies the nonnegative steady
state cash flow condition (note that existence of equilibrium is
guaranteed by proposition 5, and is constructed in the second
part of this proof). To that end, pick an arbitrary (y,w) ∈
supp Φ. To simplify the argument22, assume that Φ assigns
positive mass to the point (y˜, w˜). Thus, there must be some
other state (yˆ, wˆ) ∈ supp Φ, say, for which w˜ = w0(yˆ, wˆ; y˜). As
a consequence, w˜ ≥ UOut(y˜), since the participation constraint
must be satisfied for continuation promises.
With proposition 10, we are done if we can show that c(y˜, w˜) = y˜,
since then the autarkic allocation is implemented. Suppose not.
By the first step and by virtue of w˜ ≥ UOut(y˜), it must then
be the case that c(y˜, w˜) > y˜. Choose ² > 0 such that c(y,w) >
c(y0, w0) + ² for all (y,w), (y0, w0) ∈ supp Φ that satisfy
u0(c(y,w)) = βRu0(c(y0, w0)). (54)
Since βR < 1 and supp Φ is compact, it is easy to see that such
an ² > 0 exists. Without loss of generality23 , assume that (y˜, w˜)
has been chosen such that
c(y˜, w˜) > sup{c(y,w)|(y,w) ∈ supp Φ, c(y,w) > y}− ². (55)
Note that w˜ > UOut(y˜), since otherwise c(y˜, w˜) = y˜. Equation
(26) then implies
u0(c(yˆ, wˆ)) = βRu0(c(y˜, w˜)) (56)
By assumption about ², this implies c(yˆ, wˆ) > c(y˜, w˜) + ². By
choice of (y˜, w˜), it therefore must be the case that c(yˆ, wˆ) = yˆ
22Providing the argument for non-atomistic measures is not much harder and exploits the
continuity of the policy function c(y, w) in w, but is tedious and adds little in terms of insights.
23We need to demonstrate a contradiction for one (y˜, w˜) ∈ supp Φ satisfying c(y˜, w˜) > y˜.
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(otherwise (y˜, w˜) would not have satisfied (55)) . But this leads
to the contradiction
βRu0(y1) ≤ βR¯u0(y1) = u0(ym) ≤ u0(yˆ)
= u0(c(yˆ, wˆ)) = βRu0(c(y˜, w˜))
< βRu0(y˜) ≤ βRu0(y1). (57)
Thus the equilibrium satisfies the nonnegative steady state cash
flow condition.
2. The fact that UOut(y) = waut(y) follows from c(y, U
Out(y)) = y for
all y. Condition (44) then implies that w0(y,w; y0) = waut(y
0) for all
w ≤ w¯m(y). The promise-keeping constraint then implies that h = h(y,w)
must be as in equation (41) for w ≤ w¯m(y). The consumption function c
follows from the definition of C(.);. Once this function is known, the value
function implied by c(y,w) can be easily calculated.
3. Follows from the first part.
Note that condition (44) is essentially the same as the one stated in Krueger
and Perri (1999): in their environment with endogenous gross interest rate R,
risk sharing can only be obtained if 1β
u0(ym)
u0(y1)
< 1, whereas autarky obtains if
1
β
u0(ym)
u0(y1)
≥ 1.
3.4 Perfect Risk Sharing: Full Insurance in the Limit
Now consider the case βR = 1 in figure 2. If the agent is already at point A
with high current promises w = UOut(y2), she will stay there, no matter which
income she receives in the future. If the agent is at point B, she will stay there
as long as income is low, yt = y1. But the first time the agent receives high
income y2, she jumps to point C on the w0(y2)-branch and then stays at point
A forever, with constant utility promises and consumption. The same is true
for an agent with initial utility promise w ∈ (UOut(y1), UOut(y2)). We call
this full insurance in the limit: full insurance is not obtained upon entering the
contract, but eventually, with probability one. The stationary distribution is a
unit point mass at UOut(y2), reflecting the fact that eventually all agents are
fully insured against income fluctuations. We now prove these claims formally.
First, we demonstrate that full insurance obtains if and only if βR = 1.
Proposition 12 Suppose income is iid with probabilites π(yi) > 0.
1. Suppose that βR = 1. Then any optimal contract implies full insurance
in the limit, i.e. constant consumption from the first time that the highest
income level ym is realized.
(a) The utility promises take the form w0(w; y0) =max(w,UOut(y0)).
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(b) The decision rule for current utility h = h(w) is defined by (5). The
cost function V (w) satisfies V 0(w) = C0(h(w)) and V (w) = C(w) for
w ≥maxyUOut(y)
(c) The consumption level ci of an agent who, so far in his life, had
maximal income yi is given by
ci = a(yi)− 1
R− 1
X
j>i
π(yj) [a(yj)− a(yi)] (58)
The equilibrium outside options UOut(yi) satisfy the recursion
UOut(yi) =
(1− β)u(ci) + β
P
j>i π(yj)U
Out(yj)
(1− β) + βPj>i π(yj) (59)
with UOut(ym) = u(cm). Current utility is given by
hi = (1− β)u(ci) (60)
(d) If n = 2, then
c2 = (1− 1
R
)y2 +
1
R
E[y] (61)
and
c1 = y1 (62)
2. Conversely, suppose there is full insurance in the limit and βR ≤ 1. Then,
βR = 1.
Proof.
1. The first part follows directly from proposition 4, the fact that income is
iid and the assumption that βR = 1. The other parts follow from the first
part which implies that the contract is like a ”ratchet”: once some level
wi of utility promises is reached, the promise will not fall, and will rise
to wj , if y = yj and j > i. Define Vi = V (UOut(yi)) and ci to be the
consumption level associated with wi = UOut(yi). These satisfy
Vi = (1− 1
R
)ci +
1
R
X
j>i
π(yj)Vj + Vi ∗ (1−
X
j>i
π(yj))
 (63)
Substituting Vi = a(yi) and solving for ci delivers (58). Equations (59)-
(62) follow from simple calculations.
2. Full insurance in the limit implies, that for some w˜ ∈ [w, w¯], one has
w0(w˜; y0) ≡ w˜ for all y0. Suppose βR < 1. The first order conditions
imply that w0(w; y0) < w whenever the constraint w0(w; y0) ≥ UOut(y0)
does not bind. But UOut(y1) < UOut(ym), so it cannot be the case that
all constraints bind and w0(w˜; y1) = w0(w˜; ym); a contradiction.
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The proposition shows that on the equilibrium path of the contract, an
agent receives consumption ci, where yi is the maximal income since starting
the contract. The agent ”ratches” herself up a ladder of permanent consumption
claims. At the highest level of income, the agent receives consumption equal to
the permanent income at that point,
cm = a(ym) = (1− 1
R
)ym +
1
R
E[y] (64)
Note that E[y] < cm < ym. The principal receives an ”up front” payment ym−
cm for which he provides the permanent consumption level cm at an expected
steady state loss E[y]−cm. Since this is also the absorbing state for any contract
starting with w ≤ UOut(ym), consumption of the principal in a stationary
equilibrium equals γ = E(y)−cm. For all i < m we have that ci < a(yi), i.e. the
agent, in the current period, consumes even less than his expected income, where
1
R−1
P
j>i π(yj) [a(yj)− a(yi)] is the insurance premium for having consumption
never drop below ci again in the future, regardless of future income realizations.
The qualitative features of our optimal contract (racheting-up of consumption,
perfect insurance in the limit) are similar to those in Harris and Holmstrom’s
(1982) study of optimal wage contracts; in addition we provide, in an arguably
simpler environment, a full characterization of the optimal risk-sharing contract.
As an interpretation of the full insurance contract, consider observed health
insurance or car insurance contracts. At the start of the contract, it often
provides agents with pre-existing diseases or drivers who just had an accident
with no insurance at all. Only good risks (healthy people, good drivers) are given
an insurance contract, pay a premium, and can then be assured of continuing
coverage in the future. After the point of payment, it is no longer sensible for
the agent to switch insurance agencies and pay anew.
As a by-product of the previous proposition we can also fully characterize
the stationary distribution Φ associated with complete risk sharing in the limit.
Proposition 13 Any stationary distribution Φ on Y × [w, w¯] is given by the
cross product of the stationary distribution on incomes Y times a distribution
on [w, w¯] given by a point mass on w = UOut(ym) and an arbitrary distribution
Ψ on the interval [UOut(ym), w¯].
Proof. Follows immediately from the properties of w0(w; y).
With any starting utility promise w ≤ UOut(ym), agents reach the ab-
sorbing utility promise level UOut(ym). Agents starting at a utility promise
w > UOut(ym) will stay at that promise forever. The part Ψ comes about
from agents who have been given exceedingly generous utility promises from
the start. If all agents in the stationary distribution started from signing up
with competitive principals, then the unique stationary distribution is given by
Φ(y, UOut(ym)) = π(y), and zero elsewhere.
Finally, note that the same qualitative results as above can be proved under
the assumption of βR > 1.Now, however, the absorbing state is the upper bound
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on utility promises w¯, consumption is never declining and finally increasing to
cw¯ with probability 1. However, now w¯ acts as a real constraint and in its
absence the optimal contract (if it exists) has ever-increasing utility promises
and consumption. In general, a stationary equilibrium will not exist for βR > 1,
which led us to focus on the case βR = 1 for perfect insurance in the limit.
3.5 Partial Risk Sharing
Finally, partial insurance will obtain if
R¯ < R <
1
β
. (65)
A typical situation is shown figure 3. Suppose, the agent starts from point A,
i.e. high income. If income remains high, then the agent will remain at point
A and utility promise w3 = UOut(y2). But if income is low, the agent follows
the promise D and point B on the w0(y1)-branch, reaching promise w2 next
period. If income is low again, the agent finally arrives at point C, i.e., the
agent will land a level at the utility level w1 = UOut(y1). With high income
at either point B or at point C, the agent will move to the w0(y2)-branch, and
therefore to point A and utility level w3. The stationary distribution is given
by point masses on the points {w1, w2, w3}, with probabilities resulting from
the dynamics described above and the income probabilities. Depending on the
parameters, there may be more points likeD and B, i.e., the dynamics may need
a number of bad income draws to reach the lowest promise level UOut(y1). The
ratcheting-up part of the contract is similar to the full insurance case; but now
the wedge between β and R makes consumption have a downward drift (unlike
in Harris and Holmstrom (1982)) if not constrained by the outside options.
For the iid case with two income shocks we can provide a complete charac-
terization of the consumption dynamics and the stationary consumption distri-
butions, with the intuition provided by Figure 3.
Proposition 14 Suppose, income can take two values y1 < y2 and is iid, with
π = π(y1), and βR < 1. Then any equilibrium is characterized by a natural
number n ≥ 2, promise levels w1 = UOut(y1) < w2 < . . . < wn−1 < wn =
UOut(y2), costs V (wi) = Vi, V1 < V2 < . . . < Vn and consumption levels
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c1 < c2 < . . . < cn satisfying the following equations.
V1 = a(y1)
Vn = a(y2)
Vj =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
cj +
π
R
Vmax{j−1,1} +
(1− π)
R
Vn for all j = 1, . . . , n
u0(c(n)j ) = βRu
0(c(n)j−1) for j = 2, . . . , n
cj = c
(n)
j for j = 2, . . . , n
c1 = y1
c2 ≥ y1 > c(n)1 (66)
Proof. All equations except c1 = y1 follow from the first order conditions.
The result c1 = y1 follows from combining the first three equations into
a(y1) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
c1 +
1
R
(πa(y1) + (1− π)a(y2)) (67)
and solving for c1.
These equations can be solved reasonably easily. Iterating the third equation
and combining with the first two yields, after some algebra:
n−2X
j=0
³ π
R
´j
(cn−j − a(y2)) =
³ π
R
´n−1
(y2 − y1) (68)
where cj , j ≥ 2 are found from recursively solving the Euler equations
u0(cn−j) = (Rβ)−ju0(cn) (69)
and therefore
cn−j = (u0)
−1 £
(Rβ)−ju0(cn)
¤
(70)
= cn−j(cn) (71)
for j = 0, . . . , n− 2. Here (u0)−1 is the inverse of the marginal utility function,
a strictly decreasing function which maps R++ into itself. Evidently
cn > cn−1 > . . . > c2. (72)
and the functions cn−j(cn) are strictly increasing and continuous in cn. Now we
characterize the consumption allocation for a fixed number of steps n.
Proposition 15 For any given n ≥ 2 a unique solution to (68) exists. It
satisfies cn = y2 for n = 2 and cn ∈ (a(y2), y2) for n > 2. Furthermore cn is
decreasing in n, strictly if c2(cn) > y1.
27
Proof. The existence of a solution follows from the intermediate value
theorem, since the left hand side of (68) is continuous in cn, weakly smaller
than 0 for cn = a(y2) and increasing without bound as cn increases, whereas
the right hand side is positive and constant in cn. This argument also shows that
cn > a(y2). For n = 2 (autarky) equation (68) immediately implies cn = c2 = y2.
For n > 2 (partial risk sharing) we have cn < y2 since otherwise the principal
can never break even, since agents with bad shock y1 get to consume more than
y1 with positive probability and agents with high shock y2 consume cn.
Now we show that cn is weakly decreasing in n. For fixed n define {c(n)n−j}nj=1
as the sequence of consumption levels in the previous proposition. We want to
show that for n ≥ 0 we have c(n)n ≤ c(n−1)n−1 , with strict inequality if c(n)2 > y1.
Suppose not, then c(n)n > c
(n−1)
n−1 , and from (70)
c
(n)
n−j > c
(n−1)
n−j−1 for all j = 0, . . . , n− 3 (73)
Denoting the left hand side of (68) by Γ(n) we find, using (73), that
Γ(n− 1) < Γ(n)−
³ π
R
´n−2
[c
(n)
2 − a(y2)] (74)
and thus, using (68) again³ π
R
´n−2
[y2 − y1] <
³ π
R
´n−1
[y2 − y1]−
³ π
R
´n−2
[c
(n)
2 − a(y2)] (75)
which implies
c
(n)
2 < y1, (76)
a contradiction to the definition of c(n)2 . If c
(n)
2 > y1 we can repeat the argument
above to show that c(n)n < c
(n−1)
n−1 .
This proposition shows the partial nature of insurance. An agent with high
income y2 consumes less than his endowment, yet more than the present dis-
counted value of his future income. On the other hand, with bad income shocks
his consumption declines only slowly, in n−1 steps, towards y1. The results also
show that in order for consumption to decline in many steps (a lot of insurance
against bad shocks, high n), the principal, in order to break even, delivers less
consumption with the good income shock: c(n)n is decreasing in n.
Finally one can characterize the optimal number of steps, n∗. From propo-
sition 14 we know that c(n
∗)
1 = y1 and that c
(n∗)
2 must satisfy
u0(y1) ≥ u0
³
c
(n∗)
2
´
> βRu0(y1) (77)
Existence of an equilibrium step number n∗ is guaranteed through the general
existence proof, under condition 1. It is also evident that n∗ = 2 (with associated
c
(2)
2 = y2) is the unique equilibrium step number if and only if R <
u0(y2)
βu0(y1)
, which
confirms our results in section 3.3. Finally, the next proposition shows that n∗
is always unique.
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Proposition 16 Suppose R ≥ u0(y2)βu0(y1) . Then the optimal number of steps n∗ ≥ 3
satisfying (77) is unique.
Proof. The assumption in the proposition rules out autarky n∗ = 2 as
optimal. Now we prove uniqueness. Let n∗ ≥ 3 satisfy (77). Take arbitrary
n˜ 6= n∗. First suppose n˜ < n∗, so that n˜ = n∗ − k for some k ≥ 1. But then,
using the fact that c(n
∗)
n∗ ≤ c(n˜)n˜
u0
³
c
(n˜)
2
´
= (βR)−(n˜−2) u0
³
c
(n˜)
n˜
´
≤ (βR)−(n∗−2)+k u0
³
c
(n∗)
n∗
´
= (βR)k u0
³
c
(n∗)
2
´
≤ (βR)k u0 (y1) ≤ (βR)u0 (y1) (78)
which violates the second inequality of (77) for n = n˜. If one supposes n˜ > n∗,
a similar argument shows that the first inequality of (77) is violated for n = n˜.
Conditional on an optimal step number n it is also straightforward to calcu-
late the stationary distribution.
Proposition 17 Assume ν(y) ≡ 0, y ∈ Y . Suppose, income can take two values
and is iid, with π = P (y = y1). The stationary distribution is given by atoms
at wi with weights λi given by
λ1 = π
n−1
λj = π
n−j(1− π) for j = 2, . . . , n (79)
where n is the optimal number of steps analyzed above.
Proof. This follows from noting the following. Given any current promise
wj , the probability for reaching wn in the next period is 1− π. Thus,
λn = (1− π)
nX
j=1
λj = 1− π (80)
Next, for 1 < j < n, wj can be reached only from wj+1 and income y1. Thus
λj = πλj+1. Finally, for j = 1, w1 can be reached from both w1 or from
w2, provided income is y1. Thus λ1 = π(λ1 + λ2). Solving these equations for
λj , j = 1, . . . , n− 1 gives the result.
Note that the dynamics of the consumption contract characterized above
is similar to that in a standard endogenous incomplete markets model with
exogenous outside option (see Krueger and Perri (1999), who also consider the
case βR < 1). The qualitative difference that endogenizing the outside option by
competition makes is the pre-payment nature of insurance, and thus the fact that
low-income agents initially cannot obtain insurance at all. After pre-payment
the contract unfolds qualitatively similar to Krueger and Perri (1999), although,
quantitatively, less insurance can be achieved in our model as the constraints
on the contract are more stringent with the endogenous outside option.
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3.6 Equivalence Results
3.6.1 A Consumption-Savings Reformulation
The competitive equilibrium with risk sharing contracts between principals and
agents can also be implemented by letting the agent trade in state-contingent
one-period Arrow securities, subject to carefully chosen short-sale constraints.
More precisely, consider the consumption-savings problem
W (y, b) = max
c,(b(y0))y0∈Y
(1− β)u(c) + βX
y0
π(y0|y)W (y0, b(y0))

s.t. (81)
c+
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)b(y0) = y + b (82)
b(y0) ≥ b(y0), for all y0 ∈ Y (83)
where b(y0) is a collection of state-contingent borrowing constraints. If b(y0) = 0
for all y0 ∈ Y , then the agent is prevented from borrowing altogether.
The price of an Arrow security paying one unit of consumption tomorrow,
conditional on income realization y0 is given by q(y0|y) = π(y0|y)R b(y0). We
now want to relate the solution of this consumption-savings problem to the
competitive risk sharing contracts equilibrium studied above. Note that the
consumption-savings problem treats the interest rate R and the borrowing con-
straints b(y0) as exogenous.
Proposition 18 Any contract equilibrium V (y,w), w0(y,w; y0), c(y,w) and
n
UOut(y)
o
y∈Y
can be implemented as a solution W (y, b), b0(y, b; y0), C(y, b) to the consumption-
savings problem above with borrowing constraint given by
b(y) =
R
R− 1
³
V (y, UOut(y)− ν(y))− a(y)
´
(84)
Conversely, for given borrowing constraints b(y) ≤ 0 and solution to the consumption-
saving problem W (y, b), b0(y, b; y0), C(y, b) there exist moving costs
ν(y) =W (y, 0)−W (y, b(y)) ≥ 0 (85)
such that the solution to the consumption-savings problem can be implemented
as a contract equilibrium V (y,w), w0(y,w; y0), c(y,w) and
n
UOut(y)
o
y∈Y
. The
moving costs satisfy
UOut(y)− ν(y) =W (y, b(y)) for all y ∈ Y (86)
Proof. The details of the proof are again relegated to the technical appen-
dix; the main logic follows standard duality theory. In the contract economy
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the state variables of a contract are (y,w), in the consumption-savings problem
they are (y, b). Define the mapping between state variables as
b(y,w) =
R
R− 1 (V (y,w)− a(y)) (87)
w(y, b) = W (y, b) (88)
where both functions are strictly increasing in their second arguments and thus
invertible. With this mapping it is easy to see that the objective function of the
contract problem implies the budget constraint of the consumption problem and
the promise keeping constraint implies that the Bellman equation of consump-
tion problem is satisfied. Reversely, the objective of the consumption problem
implies the promise keeping constraint and the resource constraint implies the
Bellman equation in the contract problem.
The nontrivial parts of the proof shown in the appendix are that any fea-
sible contract satisfies the borrowing constraint in the consumption problem
and that any feasible consumption allocation satisfies the utility constraints in
the contract problem. It is finally shown by straightforward construction that
the contract allocation is optimal (and not just feasible) in the consumption
problem. If there existed a superior consumption allocation it is feasible in
the contract problem and yields lower costs, a contradiction. The reverse logic
shows that the consumption allocation solves the cost minimization problem in
the contract minimization problem.
The proposition shows that the contracting problem and the consumption
problem are dual to each other. Furthermore, the proposition connects two
strands of the previous literature. Via our equivalence result, all our find-
ings from the contract economy carry over immediately to Bewley (1986)-type
economies with trade in state-contingent Arrow securities subject to short-sale
constraints. The borrowing constraints b(y) implied by our optimal risk sharing
contracts are reminiscent of Alvarez and Jermann’s (2000) borrowing constraints
that are “not too tight”. The proposition shows that, as for their borrowing
constraints, agents can be allowed to borrow up to the point at which they are,
state by state, indifferent between repaying their debt or defaulting. Instead of
suffering financial autarky, as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000), the consequences
of default in our model amount to having to hook up with a competitor (and
bear the utility cost v(y), if any, from doing so). Thus one may interpret a
solution to our consumption-savings problem as an equilibrium with solvency
constraints in the spirit of Alvarez and Jermann. We have as immediate
Corollary 19 A contract equilibrium with zero moving costs, ν(y) ≡ 0, can be
implemented as a solution to the consumption problem with a short-sale con-
straint, b(y) = 0. Reversely, a solution to the consumption-savings problem pro-
hibiting borrowing can be implemented as a contract equilibrium with ν(y) ≡ 0.
This corollary provides a link to Bulow and Rogoff (1989): if there are no
moving costs for agents between intermediaries (such as direct trade sanctions),
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then competition among intermediaries rules out international debt. The equiv-
alence result also shows that in the contract economy without moving costs at
no point in the contract does the “balance” of the agent with the financial
intermediary become negative: after the initial payment of the agent the prin-
cipal owes the agent more future consumption (in an expected discounted value
sense) than he receives in expected discounted income from that agent, at each
point and contingency in the contract. This, again, highlights the necessary
pre-payment feature of the optimal risk sharing contracts derived in this paper.
3.6.2 Contracts without Incentives to Renegotiate
A further interpretation of our environment is one with a single principal and
agent in which contracts signed between the principal and the agent have to
be such that the agent has no incentive to call for a renegotiation.24 The
agent is assumed to have all bargaining power in the renegotiation, can demand
renegotiation at any point of time, but experiences a disutility ν(y) “up front”
from opening the renegotiation. This is equivalent to resetting the promise level
w at the beginning of any period. With his bargaining power the agent presses
the principal to the point of indifference, i.e. given current income y, she will
demand a level of utility satisfying
V (y,w) = a(y) (89)
i.e., w = UOut(y). The contract is thus constrained by w0(y,w; y0) ≥ UOut(y)−
ν(y). The equivalence between contracts in which the agent has no incentive to
ever demand renegotiation, and our environment then follows.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we constructed a model of long-term relationships between risk
averse agents with random income shocks and risk-neutral profit-maximizing
principals. We have assumed one-sided commitment in that only the principal
can commit a priori to the long-term contract. The outside option for the agent
is given by the best contract offered by competing principals.
We showed that nonnegative steady state cash flow for the principal neces-
sarily imply that the equilibrium implements the autarky solution with no risk
sharing in that case. These autarky equilibria can arise if the principal is suf-
ficiently patient. Otherwise, with sufficiently impatient principals, risk sharing
will be observed: this includes in particular the benchmark case of equal dis-
count rates for agents and principals. Agents signing up with the principal will
initially pay some “contract fee” in high income states. The principal in turn
promises to provide costly insurance later on in the life of the contract. The
contract fee thus acts as a commitment device for the agent which turns into a
liability for the (committed) principal later on.
24We decided not to call these contracts renegotiation proof contracts because that term
has a different, well-defined meaning in game theory.
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A The Sequential Formulation of the Game Be-
tween Locations
To formulate the game sequentially, we need some more notation. For dates q
and t ≥ q, let yt,qi = (yq,i, yq+1,i, . . . , yt,i) denote the endowment history from
q to t for agent i. A contract for agents newly arriving at principal j at date
q specifies mappings ct;q,j(y
t,q
i ), t = q, q+1, . . ., defining consumption given the
location-specific endowment history from date q to date t. We assume that
agents never return to a location they left, so that there is no issue of “res-
urrecting” old records. Agents originally present at principal j are assumed
to draw their initial income y0,i from some initial distribution. For the recur-
sive formulation, we shall assume that this initial distribution is the stationary
distribution.
Principals behave competitively and agents arrive with a “blank” history, i.e.
a new principal does not make particular use of the fact that new arrivals must
be agents who have defaulted on their previous principal. As mentioned above,
to make this assumption more appealing, one could assume that a fraction ² of
agents is forced to move every period anyhow: in equilibrium, these are the only
movers, so it is reasonable for the principal in the new location not to attach
any particular significance to the fact that an agent has switched locations. The
game unfolds as follows:
1. A new date t begins and each agent draws his new endowment yt,i.
2. Each principal j ∈ [0; 1] issues a new contract cs;q,j(ys,ti ), s = t, t + 1, . . .
for agents willing sign with him this period.
3. Each agent decides whether to move or not, choosing the new principal
j according to his or her preferences. He (or she) keeps the endowment
process y including the current endowment yt,i.
4. Given the current principal j, arrival date q ≤ t in that location and cur-
rent endowment history yt,q, agents provide their income to the principal
and receive consumption goods ct;q,j(y
t,q
i ), t = q, q + 1, . . ..
5. Let µj,t denote the measure of agents at principal j at date t (after the
moving decision). The principal receives the total resource surplus
Sj,t =
Z
(yt,i − ct,i)µj,t(di) (90)
We allow Sj,t to be negative. The objective of the principals is to maximize
U
(P )
j =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
E0
" ∞X
t=0
R−tSj,t
#
(91)
We focus on stationary symmetric sub-game perfect equilibria, giving rise
to the recursive formulation in the main body of the paper.
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This appendix provides details of some of the proofs in the main paper
Proposition 4: Let outside options (UOut(y))y∈Y ∈ [w, w¯] and β < 1 <
R by given. Further suppose that condition 1 in the main text is satisfied.
Then, an optimal contract for
¡
(UOut(y))y∈Y , w, w¯
¢
exists and has the following
properties.
1. V (y,w) is strictly convex, strictly increasing, continuous and differentiable
in w.
2. The decision rules are unique and continuous.
3. The decision rules and the solution to the dynamic programming problem
satisfy the first order conditions and the envelope condition
(1− β)λ =
µ
1− 1
R
¶
C0(h) (1)
λβ =
1
R
∂V
∂w
(y0, w0(y,w; y0))− µ(y0) (2)
λ =
∂V
∂w
(y,w) (3)
λ ≥ 0 (4)
µ(y0) ≥ 0, for all y0 ∈ Y (5)
where λ and µ(y0) are the Lagrange multipliers on the first and second
constraints.
4. The decision rule h(y,w) is strictly increasing in w. The decision rule
w0(y,w; y0) is weakly increasing in w, and strictly so, if the continuing
participation constraint w0(y,w; y0) ≥ UOut(y0)− ν(y0) is not binding.
1
5. If the income process is iid, then V (y,w) depends on w alone, V (y,w) ≡
V (w). If additionally UOut(y0) − ν(y0) is weakly increasing in y0, then
w0(y,w; y0) is weakly increasing in y0.
Proof. While the proof draws on fairly standard techniques as in Stokey,
Lucas with Prescott (1989), some points require particular attention.
1. Condition 1 assures that the equation
w = (1− β)h+ β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)w0(y0)
subject to w0(y0) ≥ UOut(y0) − ν(y0) always has a solution. Existence
and convexity of V follows from a standard contraction argument. The
contraction argument also shows that V (y, ·) is strictly increasing.
To prove that V (y, ·) is strictly convex we make use of the fact that
under our assumptions the value function from the sequential and the
recursive problem of the principal coincide. Now consider some y and
w1 6= w2 and, for each wi, consider a stochastic sequence of optimal
choices (yt,i, wt,i, ht,i)∞t=0 from iterating the solution to the dynamic pro-
gramming problem forward, starting with y0,i = y and w0,i = wi. Note
that we do not require at this point that there is a unique solution. Note
that w−βw¯ ≤ ht ≤ w¯−βw. This implies convergence of discounted sums
of the ht,i and, per iteration,
wi = (1− β)E
 ∞X
j=0
βtht,i

A similar iteration for V (y,wi) and observing the upper bound V (y,w) ≤
V (y, w¯)) ≤ C(w¯) <∞ yields
V (y,wi) = E
 ∞X
j=0
1
Rt
C(ht,i)

Consider now the convex combination wλ = λw1 + (1− λ)w2. A feasible
plan is given by the convex combination of (wt,i, ht,i)∞t=0, with costs given
by
Vλ = E
 ∞X
j=0
1
Rt
C(ht,λ)
 < λV (y,w1) + (1− λ)V (y,w2)
where ht,λ = λht,1 + (1− λ)ht,2 and the inequality follows from the strict
convexity of the cost function C. Obviously V (y,wλ) ≤ Vλ < λV (y,w1)+
(1− λ)V (y,w2).
2
2. Now we want to show that the value function is differentiable. Rewrite
the Bellman equation in the main text in operator form
T [V (y,w)] = min
h∈D,{w0(y0)∈[w,w¯]}y0∈Y
µ
1− 1
R
¶
C(h) +
1
R
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)V (y0, w0(y0))
s.t. w = (1− β)h+ β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)w0(y0) (6)
We want to show that the fixed point V ∗ of the operator T is differentiable,
conditional on having established that it is unique (contraction mapping
theorem), and that it is strictly convex. Define the sequence of functions
{Vn}∞n=1 as
V0(y,w) = C(w)
Vn+1(y,w) = T [Vn(y,w)]
We now note the following
• Vn → V ∗ uniformly (by the contraction mapping theorem)
• Since by assumption C is strictly convex, all Vn are strictly convex
(this follows from simple induction).
• For each n, the associated policy correspondences hn, w0n(y0) are
single-valued, continuous functions, since the Vn are strictly convex.
• Again by induction one shows that each Vn is continuously differen-
tiable: clearly V0 is, then by the envelope theorem
∂V1(y,w)
∂w
=
¡
1− 1R
¢
1− β C
0(h1(y,w))
and thus V1 is continuously differentiable (since h1 is continuous).
Continue the induction to show that all Vn are continuously differ-
entiable, with
∂Vn(y,w)
∂w
=
¡
1− 1R
¢
1− β C
0(hn(y,w))
• V ∗ is strictly convex
• w ∈ [w, w¯], a compact set. Now we can apply Stokey, Lucas with
Prescott (1989), Theorem 3.8., which guarantees that hn, w0n(y0) con-
verge uniformly to (h,w0(y0)), the optimal policies associated with the
fixed point V ∗. This implies that
∂Vn+1(y,w)
∂w
=
∂T [Vn(y,w)]
∂w
→
¡
1− 1R
¢
1− β C
0(h(y,w))
uniformly. But since Vn → V ∗ uniformly, the expression (1−
1
R)
1−β C
0(h(y,w))
is the derivative of V ∗ at (y,w). Uniqueness of the decision rules now
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follows from strict convexity of the objective function in the operator
equation.1
3. Deriving the first-order conditions is standard.
4. The monotonicity properties in w follow from the first order conditions,
the fact, that V (y,w) is strictly convex in w and the strict convexity of
the cost function c = C(h).
5. The fact that V does not depend on y in the iid case follows from the fact
that y appears in the Bellman equation within the conditional probabilities
π(y0|y), which are independent of y in the iid case. The properties for
w0(w, y; y0) follow from the first order conditions, the fact that UOut(y)−
ν(y) is increasing in y and strict convexity of V .
Proposition 5: Let condition 1 be satisfied. Then an optimal contract and
outside options
©
UOut(y)
ª
y∈Y satisfying (13) in the main text exist. If the
income process is iid (or w0(y,w; y0) associated with
©
UOut(y)
ª
y∈Y is weakly
increasing in y), then an equilibrium exists.
Proof. We will prove this proposition for ν(y) ≡ 0; equivalent arguments
prove existence for the general case. We first prove that there exists outside
options UOut = (UOut(y1), . . . , UOut(ym)) and associated value and policy func-
tions VUOut , hUOut , w0UOut(y
0) of the principals solving VUOut(y, UOut(y)) = a(y)
for all y. Then we prove that the Markov transition function induced by π and
w0UOut(y
0) has a stationary distribution.
For the first part define the function f : [w, w¯]m → [w, w¯]m by
fj
£
UOut
¤
= min{w˜ ∈ [w, w¯] : VUOut(yj , w˜) ≥ a(yj)} for all j = 1, . . . ,m
We need to show three things: 1) The function f is well defined on all of
[w, w¯]m, 2) The function f is continuous, 3) Any fixed point w∗ of f satisfies
Vw∗(yj , w∗j ) = a(yj) for all j = 1, . . . ,m. We discuss each point in turn
1. If the set {w˜ ∈ [w, w¯] : VUOut(yj , w˜) ≥ a(yj)} is non-empty for all j,
then the function f is well-defined since the minimization over w˜ is a
minimization of a continuous function over a compact set. To show that
the set is non-empty for all j and all UOut ∈ [w, w¯]m it suffices to show
that Vw(yj , w¯) ≥ a(yj) for all j, since Vw(yj , w) is strictly increasing in w
and Vw(yj , w) ≤ VUOut(yj , w) for all UOut ∈ [w, w¯]m and all w ∈ UOut ∈
[w, w¯]. Let Vˆ denote the cost function of a principal that does not face the
competition constraints. But then
Vw(yj , w¯) ≥ Vˆ (yj , w¯) = a¯ ≡ max
i
a(yi) ≥ a(yj)
where the first equality follows from the definition of w¯ in the main text.
This proves the first point in our list.
1The main parts of this proof stem from Krueger (1999), which in turn adopts the proof
strategy of Atkeson and Lucas (1995).
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2. In order to prove that f is continuous in UOut ∈ [w, w¯]m it is useful to
rewrite f as
fj
£
UOut
¤½ = w if VUOut(yj , w) > a(yj)
solves VUOut(yj , fj
£
UOut
¤
) = a(yj) if VUOut(yj , w) ≤ a(yj)
In the first case fj
£
UOut
¤
is independent of UOut, in the second case it
moves continuously in UOut as long as VUOut(., .) is uniformly continuous
in UOut. Furthermore the switching point between the two cases moves
continuously with UOut if VUOut(., .) is uniformly continuous in UOut.
Thus it suffices to show uniform continuity of VUOut(., .) in UOut. Take
a sequence {UOutn }∞n=0 in [w, w¯]m converging to UOut. Let k.k denote the
sup-norm and TUOutn the operator associated with the Bellman equation
(7) for outside options UOutn . Let T
k
UOutn
denote the TUOutn operator being
applied k times. Note that by the triangle inequality°°VUOutn − VUOut°° ≤ °°°VUOutn − TnUOutn VUOut°°°+ °°°TnUOutn VUOut − VUOut°°°
Since TUOutn is a contraction mapping for all U
Out
n ,
°°°VUOutn − TnUOutn VUOut°°°
converges to 0 as n → ∞. Again by the triangle inequality and the fact
that TUOutn is a contraction mapping with modulus
1
R we have°°°TnUOutn VUOut − VUOut°°° ≤ nX
k=1
°°°T kUOutn VUOut − T k−1UOutn VUOut°°°
≤
n−1X
k=0
R−k
°°TUOutn VUOut − VUOut°°
=
n−1X
k=0
R−k
°°TUOutn VUOut − TUOutVUOut°°
where the last equality follows from the fact that VUOut is a fixed point of
TUOut . Since
Pn−1
k=0 R
−k converges, if we can show that
°°TUOutn VUOut − TUOutVUOut°°
converges to 0 in n we have demonstrated that
°°VUOutn − VUOut°° converges
to 0 in n, that is, VUOutn converges to VUOut uniformly. Consider the func-
tion
ψ(y,w,UOut) = min
h,{w0(y0)}∈Γ(y,wUOut)
µ
1− 1
R
¶
C(h)
1
R
+
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|y)VUOut(y0, w0(y0))
with constraint set
Γ(y,w,UOut) = {h,w0(y0)|h ∈ D,w0(y0) ∈ [w, w¯], (8) and (9) of main text}.
on Y × [w, w¯]m+1. Since for all (y,w,UOut) ∈ Y × [w, w¯]m+1 the objective
function is continuous and the constraint set is continuous, non-empty and
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compact-valued, by the theorem of the maximum ψ is continuous, and
thus continuous in particular with respect to UOut. Uniformity follows
from the compactness of the space Y × [w, w¯]m+1, so that VUOutn converges
to VUOut uniformly. From points 1. and 2. it follows that the function f
defined above is well-defined and continuous on the compact space [w, w¯]m.
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem now guaranties existence of a w∗ ∈ [w, w¯]m
such that w∗ = f(w∗). In point 3. we now argue that this fixed point has
the desired property that Vw∗(yj , w∗j ) = a(yj).
3. Suppose not. Then there is some non-empty index set J , so that Vw∗(yj , w∗j ) =
a(yj) for all j /∈ J and Vw∗(yj , w∗j ) > a(yj) as well as w∗j = w for j ∈ J .
We will now show that Vw∗ cannot be the solution to its Bellman equa-
tion. Let ∆ = maxj(Vw∗(yj , w∗j )− a(yj)): by assumption in this proof by
contradiction, ∆ > 0. Let T be large enough so that
1−R−T
1−R−1 (y −minj yj) +
1
RT
∆ < 0
Such a T exists, since we have assumed in our definition of the lower bound
w that y−minj yj < 0. We will now construct sequential allocations that
attain utility promises w∗(y0) at lower cost than Vw∗(y0, w∗(y0)), contra-
dicting the fact that Vw∗(., .) is the cost function associated with outside
options w∗. Let Vseq(y,w) denote the cost function from the sequential
allocation to be constructed now. Let σt = (w0, j0, . . . , jt) be the history
of income states until date t, including the initial promise w0 ∈ [w, w¯].
A sequential decision rule must specify choices
¡
h(σt), (w0(y0j ;σt))mj=1
¢
for
any t and any history σt. Consider the following allocation: for a given t
and σt :
• If t < T and if js ∈ J for all s ≤ t and if w0 = w∗(y0), provide utility
ht = h (where h is specified below). Furthermore, set the promises
(w0(y0j ;σt))mj=1 equal to the fixed point w∗.
• If t ≥ T or if t < T and if js /∈ J for some s ≤ t or if w0 6=
w∗(y0), provide utility hjt and promises (w0(y0j ;σt))
m
j=1 according to
the decision rule of the proposed solution Vw∗(y,w), where y = yt
and w = w0(yt;σt−1), if t > 0, and w = w0, if t = 0.
We need to check that a) the continuation promise is always at least as
large as the outside option w∗, b) the realized utility w(σt) to the agent is
always equal to the promise w = w0(yt;σt−1), if t > 0, and w = w0 if t = 0.
and c) the resulting cost function Vseq is nowhere higher than the candidate
solution Vw∗ , i.e. Vseq(y0, w0) ≤ Vw∗(y0, w0). Furthermore, the costs are
not larger than a(yj) for all j and all initial states (y0 = yj , w∗(y0)). Then,
since the costs exceed a(yj) for some j in the proposed solution Vw∗ to the
Bellman equation, this then renders a contradiction that Vw∗ is a solution
to the Bellman equation. Let us check each of the items a) - c) above.
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a. Continuation promise is always is at least as large as the outside
options w∗. True by construction, since it is true for the decision rules of
Vw∗ and since it is also true at the changed decisions under the first bullet
point.
b. Realized utility w(σt) of agent equals the promise w = w0(yt;σt−1),
if t > 0, and w = w0 if t = 0. Since this must be true along histories
simply following the decision rules given by the candidate solution Vw∗ ,
we only need to check this for the case that t < T , js ∈ J for all s ≤ t and
w0 = w
∗(y0). But along these paths, w0 = w for t = 0 and w0(yt;σt−1) =
w∗(y0) for t > 0. The claim follows with
w = (1− β)h+ β
X
y0∈Y
π(y0|yt)w∗(y0)
> (1− β) inf (D) + βw¯
Note that condition 1 in the main text assures that the h required by this
equation lies in D and that consequently there exists a c ∈ (0, y] such that
h = u(c). The fact that c ≤ y follows from the fact that w∗(y0) ≥ w and
the definition of y in the main text.
c. Resulting cost function is nowhere higher than the candidate
solution Vw∗ , i.e. Vseq(y0, w0) ≤ Vw∗(y0, w0). Furthermore, the
costs are not larger than a(yj) for all j and all initial states (y0 =
yj , w
∗(y0)). The claim is true by construction if the sequential decisions
just follows along the decision rules of the candidate solution Vw∗ , since
in particular, Vw∗(yj , w∗j ) = a(yj) for all j /∈ J . Consider now j ∈ J ,
the initial state y0 = yj and the initial promise w∗(y0) = w. Consider all
possible histories σT until date T and define the stopping time τ(σT ) to
be the earliest date t = 1, . . . , T , at which jt /∈ J , and set τ(σT ) = T , if
all jt, t = 1, . . . , T belong to the set J . Let π(σT , t) the probability of the
history, truncated at date t. The costs can now be calculated directly as
Vseq(y0, w)
=
µ
1− 1
R
¶X
σT

τ(σT )−1X
t=0
1
Rt
π(σT , t)c
+ 1
Rτ(σT )
π(σT , τ(σT ))Vw∗(yjt , w
∗(yjt))

≤
µ
1− 1
R
¶X
σT

τ(σT )−1X
t=0
1
Rt
π(σT , t)y
+ 1
Rτ(σT )
π(σT , τ(σT ))Vw∗(yjt , w
∗(yjt))

where the inequality follows from the fact that c ≤ y.Now note the fol-
lowing. For any history σT , for which jt /∈ J for some t ≤ T , we have
V (yjt , w
∗(yjt)) = a(yjt) at t = τ(σT )) and we have costs no larger than
y < min yj for t < τ(σT )), so that costs conditional on these paths are no
higher than the net present value a(y0,σT ) of the income, conditional on
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these paths, where
a(y0,σT ) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶ÃÃT−1X
t=0
π(σT , t)
1
Rt
yjt
!
+ π(σT , T )
1
RT
a(yjT )
!
Finally consider the histories σT , for which jt ∈ J for all t = 0, . . . , T .
For these paths, the contribution κ(σT ) to the costs are
κ(σT ) =
µ
1− 1
R
¶ÃÃT−1X
t=0
1
Rt
π(σT , t)c
!
+
1
RT
π(σT , T )V (yjt , w
∗(yjt))
!
≤
µ
1− 1
R
¶ÃÃT−1X
t=0
1
Rt
π(σT , t)y
!
+
1
RT
π(σT , T )V (yjt , w
∗(yjt))
!
≤ a(y0,σT ) +
µ
1− 1
R
¶ÃÃT−1X
t=0
1
Rt
π(σT , t)(y −min
j
yj)
!
+
1
RT
π(σT , T )∆
!
≤ a(y0,σT ) +
µ
1− 1
R
¶
π(σT , T )
µ
1−R−T
1−R−1 (y −minj yj) +
1
RT
∆
¶
≤ a(y0,σT )
by our assumption about T . This finishes the check of point c), thus part
3. and therefore the entire proof of the existence of equilibrium outside
options UOut = w∗. It remains to be shown that a stationary distribution
associated with the optimal decision rules for equilibrium outside options
w∗ exist.
From now on let (h,w0(y0)) denote the optimal policies of the principal
associated with the equilibrium outside options UOut = w∗, whose existence
was established above. We know that {w0(y,w; y0)}y0∈Y are continuous func-
tions on Z. Let Q : Z × B(Z) → [0, 1] denote the Markov transition function
as defined in the main text. Since the policy functions are continuous and
hence measurable, by theorem 9.13 of Stokey et al. (1989) Q is indeed a well-
defined transition function. Furthermore, by their theorem 8.2. the operator
T ∗ : Λ(Z × B(Z)) → Λ(Z × B(Z)) mapping the space of probability measures
on (Z ×B(Z)) into itself and defined as
T ∗Φ(A) =
Z
Q(z,A)Φ(dz)
is well-defined. Showing that there exists an invariant probability measure Φ
associated with Q amounts to showing the existence of a fixed point of the op-
erator T ∗. Theorem 12.10 of Stockey and Lucas (1989) guarantees the existence
of a fixed point if the state space is compact (which is satisfied in our case) and
Q satisfies the Feller property, that is, for all bounded continuous functions f
the function
Tf(y,w) =
Z
f(y0, w0)Q(y,w, dy0 × dw0)
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is continuous. But by definition of Q we have
Tf(y,w) =
Z
f(y0, w0)Q(y,w, dy0 × dw0) =
X
y0∈Y
f(y0, w0(y,w; y0))π(y0|y)
which is obviously continuous in (y,w), since w0(y,w; y0) is continuous in w.
Proposition 18: Any contract equilibrium V (y,w), w0(y,w; y0), c(y,w) and©
UOut(y)
ª
y∈Y can be implemented as a solution W (y, b), b
0(y, b; y0), C(y, b) to
the consumption-savings problem above with borrowing constraint given by
b(y) =
R
R− 1
¡
V (y, UOut(y)− ν(y))− a(y)¢ (7)
Conversely, for given borrowing constraints b(y) ≤ 0 and associated solution to
the consumption-saving problem W (y, b), b0(y, b; y0), C(y, b) there exist moving
costs
ν(y) =W (y, 0)−W (y, b(y)) ≥ 0
such that the solution to the consumption-savings problem can be implemented
as a contract equilibrium V (y,w), w0(y,w; y0), c(y,w) and
©
UOut(y)
ª
y∈Y . The
moving costs satisfy
UOut(y)− ν(y) =W (y, b(y)) for all y ∈ Y (8)
Proof. In the contract economy the state variables of a contract are (y,w),
in the consumption-savings problem they are (y, b). Define the mapping between
state variables as
b(y,w) =
R
R− 1 (V (y,w)− a(y)) (9)
w(y, b) = W (y, b) (10)
where both functions are strictly increasing in their second arguments and thus
invertible. We denote the inverse of b(y,w) by w = b−1(y, b): it is that lifetime
utility level w which requires initial bond holdings b to realize that level in the
bond economy. Let b = w−1(y,w) be similarly defined. Furthermore define
b = w−1(y,w) and b¯ = w−1(y, w¯).2 Finally define the map between policies and
value functions in the two problems as
c(y, b) = C(h(y,w(y, b))) (11)
b0(y, b; y0) = b(y0, w0(y,w(y, b); y0))
W (y, b) = b−1(y, b)
2When mapping the bond economy into the contract economy bounds on bond holdings
[b, b¯] map into utility bounds [w, w¯] in a similar fashion. A lower bound on bond holdings is
always guaranteed via the borrowing constraints; when we start with the bond economy we
assume the existence of an upper bound on bond holdings. Under fairly general conditions this
upper bound can be chosen without imposing additional binding restrictions on the problem
(although this is not crucial for the equivalence result).
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and
h(y,w) = u(c(y, b(y,w))) (12)
w0(y,w; y0) = w(y0, b0(y, b(y,w); y0))
V (y,w) = w−1(y,w)
With policies so defined it is straightforward to verify that (W, c, b0) con-
structed from the contract problem as in (11) satisfy the Bellman equation of
the consumption problem (since the underlying (V, h,w0) satisfy the promise
keeping constraint in the contract problem) and the budget constraint (since
(V, h,w0) satisfy the Bellman equation of the contract problem). Reversely, one
can equally easily verify that (V, h,w0) constructed from the consumption prob-
lem as in (12) satisfy the Bellman equation of the contract problem (since the
underlying (W, c, b0) satisfy the budget constraint in the contract problem) and
the promise keeping constraint (since (W, c, b0) satisfy the Bellman equation of
the consumption problem).
Now we show that any feasible contract satisfies the borrowing constraint
in the savings problem and that any consumption allocation satisfies the utility
constraints in the contract problem. First we show that the bond holdings
b0(y, b(w, y); y0) =
R
R− 1
¡
V (y0, w0(y, b−1(y, b); y0))− a(y0)¢ (13)
derived from the contract problem satisfy the short-sale constraints
b(y0) =
R
R− 1
¡
V (y0, UOut(y0)− ν(y0))− a(y0)¢
in the consumption problem. Since V is strictly increasing in its second argu-
ment and the function w0(y,w; y0) satisfies
w0(y,w; y0) ≥ UOut(y0)− ν(y0)
we have
b0(y, b(w, y); y0) =
R
R− 1
¡
V (y0, w0(y, b−1(y, b); y0))− a(y0)¢
≥ R
R− 1
¡
V (y, UOut(y0)− v(y0))− a(y0)¢
= b(y)
Second we show that the future utility promises
w0(y,w; y0) =W (y0, b0(y, b; y0)) (14)
derived from the savings problem satisfy the contract enforcement constraints.
We note, since
b0(y, b; y0) ≥ b(y0)
10
that
w0(y,w; y0) =W (y0, b0(y, b; y0)) ≥W (y0, b(y0)) =W (y0, 0)− ν(y0) (15)
using that the function W is strictly increasing in its second argument and
the definition of v(y0). Now we note that in the consumption problem lifetime
utility w =W(y, b) can be delivered at lifetime cost b+ Ra(y)R−1 . Thus V (y,w) =
V [y,W (y, b)] = a(y)+ R−1R b is the cost in per-period terms. From this it follows
that
V [y0,W (y0, 0)] = a(y0) = V (y0, UOut(y0))
and thus
W(y0, 0) = UOut(y0) (16)
Combining (14)-(16) yields
w0(y,w; y0) ≥ UOut(y0)− ν(y)
that is, the utility promises derived from the consumption problem satisfy the
enforcement constraint. FromW (y0, 0) = UOut(y0) also (8) immediately follows.
These results imply that consumption-bond policies and value function (W, c, b0)
derived from the contract policies are feasible for the consumption problem and
the value function satisfies the Bellman recursion. It remains to be shown that
for the given value function W on the right hand side of Bellman’s equation
for the consumption problem, the policies (c, b0) are indeed optimal. Reversely,
it remains to be shown that for the given value function V on the right hand
side of the contract minimization problem (h,w0) are the optimal policies. Since
both directions follow exactly the same logic we shall only prove the direction
that (c, b0) are indeed optimal.
We will do so by arguing that if (c, b0) weren’t optimal one can construct a
contract policy from the superior consumption policy that yields lower costs than
the optimal contract allocation, a contradiction. This argument is most simply
made in the sequential analogue of the recursive formulation. Let {ht(w0, yt)}
denote the utility allocation that solves the contract cost minimization problem
for (y0, w0) ∈ Y × [w, w¯] and define the corresponding consumption allocation
by
ct(b0, y
t) = C(ht(w0, y
t))
where b0 and w0 are related by b0 = w−1(y0, w0). Now suppose there exist
(y∗0 , b∗0) ∈ Y × [b, b¯] such that {ct(b∗0, yt)} does not solve the consumer maxi-
mization problem; denote by {c˜t(b∗0, yt)} the allocation that beats it. Now find
w∗0 = b−1(y∗0 , b∗0) and define
h˜t(w
∗
0, y
t) = u(c˜t(b
∗
0, y
t))
and the new utility allocation hˆt by
hˆt(w
∗
0, y
t) = h˜t(w
∗
0, y
t) for t > 0
hˆ0(w
∗
0 , y
∗
0) = h˜0(w
∗
0, y
∗
0)− ε
11
for ε > 0 and small. The allocation {h˜t} (and thus the allocation {h˜t}) satisfies
the sequential analogues of the no-moving constraints because {ct} (that is, the
implied asset holdings) satisfy the borrowing constraints of the consumption
problem. Furthermore
w∗0 = h0(w
∗
0, y
∗
0) +
X
t≥1
X
yt
πt(y
t)ht(w
∗
0 , y
t)
< h˜0(w
∗
0, y
∗
0) +
X
t≥1
X
yt
πt(y
t)h˜t(w
∗
0 , y
t)
= hˆ0(w
∗
0, y
∗
0) + ε+
X
t≥1
X
yt
πt(y
t)hˆt(w
∗
0 , y
t)
where the first inequality comes from the fact that the consumption allocation
{ct} associated with the optimal contract allocation {ht} is beaten by {c˜t} in
lifetime utility terms. Thus we can choose ε > 0 such that
w∗0 = hˆ0(w
∗
0 , y
∗
0) +
X
t≥1
X
yt
πt(y
t)hˆt(w
∗
0 , y
t)
Note that allocations {ht} and {h˜t} have the same expected discounted costs,
since the associated {ct} and {c˜t} both satisfy the intertemporal budget con-
straint of the consumption problem. But then by construction {hˆt} costs less
than {ht} and also delivers lifetime utility w∗0, a contradiction to the fact that
{ht} is the optimal allocation for the contract minimization problem.
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